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Resolving the Anti-Antievolutionism Dilemma: A Brief for 
Relational Evolutionary Thinking in Anthropology 
Emily Schultz 
 
Abstract:  Anthropologists often disagree about whether, or in what ways, anthropology is 
“evolutionary.” Anthropologists defending accounts of primate or human biological development 
and evolution that conflict with mainstream “neo-Darwinian” thinking have sometimes been 
called “creationists” or have been accused of being “antiscience.” As a result, many cultural 
anthropologists struggle with an “anti-antievolutionism” dilemma: they are more comfortable 
opposing the critics of evolutionary biology, broadly conceived, than they are defending 
mainstream evolutionary views with which they disagree. Evolutionary theory, however, comes 
in many forms. Relational evolutionary approaches such as Developmental Systems Theory, 
niche construction, and autopoiesis–natural drift augment mainstream evolutionary thinking in 
ways that should prove attractive to many anthropologists who wish to affirm evolution but are 
dissatisfied with current “neo-Darwinian” hegemony. Relational evolutionary thinking moves 
evolutionary discussion away from reductionism and sterile nature–nurture debates and promises 
to enable fresh approaches to a range of problems across the subfields of anthropology. 
Keywords: evolutionary anthropology, Developmental Systems Theory, niche construction, 
autopoeisis, natural drift 
 
Anthropologists often disagree about whether, or in what ways, anthropology is “evolutionary.” 
However, some anthropologists who support evolution but criticize mainstream “neo-Darwinian” 
thinking have been called “creationists” or have been accused of being “antiscience.” As a 
consequence, I argue, many anthropologists struggle with an “anti-antievolutionism” dilemma: 
they are more comfortable opposing the critics of evolutionary biology, broadly conceived, than 
they are defending mainstream evolutionary views with which they disagree. Evolutionary 
thinking in biological science, however, comes in many varieties, including relational or 
“process” perspectives that neither repudiate science nor embrace creationism. These 
perspectives decenter mainstream “neo-Darwinian” claims, affirming and connecting, rather than 
explaining away, the achievements of anthropologists across the subfields. Such perspectives 
may even offer a way of resolving the “anti-antievolution” dilemma. 
In the first part of this article, I review the struggle over what counts as scientific evolutionary 
thinking in anthropology, analyzing rhetorical tactics some anthropologists adopt in an apparent 
effort to avoid being targeted by defenders of mainstream evolutionary views. In the second part, 
I characterize the anti-antievolution dilemma, arguing that it will remain irresolvable as long as 
all parties to the struggle assume that “neo-Darwinism” is the only scientific account of 
evolution. In part three, I challenge this assumption, describing alternative “dissident” positions 
in evolutionary theory, particularly those of developmental biologist Conrad H. Waddington, 
whose ideas foreshadowed relational evolutionary perspectives that have become prominent in 
recent years. In part four, I discuss three such perspectives—Developmental Systems Theory 
(DST), niche construction, and complex self-organization—and compare them with mainstream 
“neo-Darwinian” accounts. Finally, I conclude by reviewing the benefits that relational 
evolutionary perspectives can bring to anthropology. 
Is Anthropology an Evolutionary Discipline? 
The role that evolutionary thinking ought to play in anthropology has been debated for years. In 
1994, biological anthropologist Matt Cartmill addressed a gathering of biological 
anthropologists, reporting that the relationship between biological anthropology and mainstream 
anthropology had “become a strange anomaly” (1994:1) and declaring that “for the first time in 
the history of our science, we are facing … a principled rejection by mainstream anthropologists 
of the evolutionary tradition that underlies everything we do—and that originally held 
anthropology together” (1994:3). In 2005, Daniel Segal and Sylvia Yanagisako also described 
“the growing epistemological divergence between different forms of anthropology, notably 
between biological and cultural approaches” (2005:7). For them, however, this divergence was 
no strange anomaly; on the contrary, they complained that, in their experience, “so-called 
biocultural syntheses” are in fact “acts of reduction … of the cultural-social to the biological” 
(Segal and Yanagisako 2005:11). As a result, 
calls for four-field holism and biocultural integration are often, in our experience, thinly 
disguised attacks on those strands of cultural-social anthropology—specifically 
interpretive and constructivist approaches—most visibly in tension with 
positivism … lumping any and all nonpositivist approaches to cultures and societies into 
the demonized category of “postmodernism.” (Segal and Yanagisako 2005:12) 
Linking biocultural integration with four-field holism, and both of these with positivism, also 
enabled Segal and Yanagisako to take aim at 19th-century unilineal social evolutionism. They 
insisted that four-field anthropology was “a carrier of the social-evolutionary figure of the 
division of humanity into a civilizational Self and relatively backward (less and pre-civilized) 
Others” and therefore “saturated with sentiments of settler-colonial nationalism” (Segal and 
Yanagisako 2005:8, 16). Breaking up four-field anthropology, therefore, could free cultural-
social anthropologists from both the threat of biological reductionism and the taint of social 
evolutionism. 
At the same time, Segal and Yanagisako's texts struggle to disentangle the evolutionary biology 
they want from the biological reductionism and social evolutionism they reject. Taken together, 
for example, the citations above suggest that “biological approaches” in anthropology are 
responsible for the “biocultural integration” that “often” reduces culture to biology and for 
“positivist” attacks on “nonpositivist approaches to cultural and society.” Because 
anthropologists who take “biological approaches” in anthropology have long been committed to 
forms of Darwinian evolutionary theory, the conclusion might seem to follow that Darwinian 
evolutionary theory stands condemned as a form of positivist science. But such is not the case. 
Consider the following passage from Yanagisako's chapter in Unwrapping the Sacred Bundle: 
Sociocultural anthropologists, in particular, have grown increasingly critical of the racial and 
cultural hierarchies and political inequalities that are naturalized by evolutionist approaches to 
human diversity. This is not to say that sociocultural anthropologists reject Darwinian theories of 
human evolution, but rather that we reject explanations of human cultural and social variation 
that rest on untenable assumptions of “classical evolutionism.”(Yanagisako 2005:80) 
Yanagisako's broad indictment of “evolutionist approaches to human diversity” immediately 
exempts “Darwinian theories of human evolution,” and she further qualifies her claim a few 
sentences later, noting that “there are, of course, notable exceptions to the way scholars in the 
four fields align themselves in this disagreement, and I do not mean to oversimplify the schism” 
(2005:80). Nevertheless, she names no biological anthropologists whose views align with her 
own, and no essay in Unwrapping the Sacred Bundle was contributed by a biological 
anthropologist. 
Equally curious is Segal and Yanagisakos’ assertion that anthropology's Boasian legacy matters 
only because it “served primarily to implode, rather than to extend or develop, an active line in 
physical anthropology—specifically, research into racial character and differences” (2005:13). 
They say nothing about the way research by Franz Boas and his students prepared the ground for 
the “new” antiracist physical anthropology—or biological anthropology—that took shape in 
North America after World War II. The recent work of Clarence Gravlee and his colleagues 
(2003a, 2003b), for example, illustrates the kind of contemporary biological anthropology that 
challenges biological reductionism. Critiquing recent reanalyses of Boas's classic work (i.e., 
Sparks and Jantz 2002), they defend Boas's original conclusions by relying not only on 
contemporary population biology but also on contemporary work by evolutionary biologists and 
biological anthropologists such as Richard Lewontin (1974), Barry Bogin (1999), Jonathan 
Marks (2002), and John Relethford (2002, 2003). Contemporary antiracist biological 
anthropologists have also taken on challenges that did not exist in Boas's day, actively wrestling, 
for example, with complex issues raised by the Human Genome Diversity Project (Reardon 
2005) and, more generally, with the potentially oppressing and liberating possibilities offered by 
the entry of genomics into contemporary struggles over “race” and other forms of identity. 
In fact, numerous biological anthropologists support Segal and Yanagisako's unwillingness to 
reduce culture to biology. Biological anthropologist George Armelagos, for example, in working 
with students and colleagues, has long criticized the biological race concept (e.g., Armelagos and 
Goodman 1998) and has brought a critical perspective to biological, medical, and 
bioarchaeological studies of human populations. A number of recent Wenner-Gren symposia 
have brought together biological anthropologists, cultural anthropologists, and others to address 
political economic perspectives on human biology (Goodman and Leatherman 1998); models of 
science, gender, and society in primatology (Strum and Fedigan 2000); anthropology in the age 
of genetics (Goodman et al. 2003); and the challenges of reductionisms in biological and cultural 
anthropology (McKinnon and Silverman 2005a). The Program for Dialogue on Science, Ethics, 
and Religion of the American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored another 
collection, The Origins and Nature of Sociality (Sussman and Chapman 2004). In the volume, 
contributors’ backgrounds ranged across the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities, 
and half were biological anthropologists, paleoanthropologists, and primatologists. The fields of 
medical anthropology and science studies have attracted biological anthropologists and cultural 
anthropologists who are neither “antiscience” nor “anticulture” and who work to situate the 
production of biological and anthropological knowledge in a culturally, socially, politically, and 
economically complex world (e.g., Franklin 2007; Haraway 1989, 1997, 2008; Lock 2001; 
Trevathan 2007). 
Indeed, as I show below, British social anthropologist Tim Ingold has been involved for many 
years in an ongoing critique of received views about biological evolution, together with a search 
for theoretical alternatives outside the mainstream. He has learned, however, that collaborations 
among biological and cultural anthropologists that challenge mainstream interpretations in 
evolutionary biology are risky undertakings. Consider a collection of articles he coedited with 
biological anthropologist Kathleen Gibson (Gibson and Ingold 1993). Gibson, Ingold, and their 
contributors stepped back from standard accounts of human evolution to reconsider possible 
connections among a range of phenomena that do not figure prominently in such accounts, such 
as potential links among gesture, tool use, and language. Their book was denounced as 
“partisan,” however, because it “marginaliz[ed] neo-Darwinian theory”; moreover, the “‘holistic’ 
way” it dissolved “primate-human distinctions” was labeled “creationism in a new guise” 
(Knight 1995:396). Or consider a 1990 conference entitled “Women Scientists Look at 
Evolution: Female Biology and Life History” that was subjected to denigrating misrepresentation 
in Science magazine (Dushek 1990). Although a letter to the editor attempted to correct these 
misrepresentations (Galloway 1990), negative repercussions shadowed this event and its 
participants for years. Nevertheless, the book that came out of this conference (Morbeck et al. 
1997) received favorable reviews, in part because of its use of “nonmainstream” field data on life 
histories of actual primate females to critique formal life-history models in evolutionary biology 
(e.g., Altman 1998; Mealey 2000; Sinha 1998). In 2006, one of the contributors recalled the 
unpleasantness generated by the media distortions but remarked that in the intervening 16 years 
“supportive remarks supplanted disapproving quips” (Vitzthum 2006). 
It was also in the year 2006 that two psychologists and one biologist—Alex Mesoudi, Andrew 
Whiten, and Kevin Laland—published a target article in the journal Behavior and Brain Sciences 
entitled “Toward a Unified Science of Cultural Evolution,” in which they claimed that a  
growing body of theory implies that culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary 
properties. If this is accepted, it follows that the same tools, methods, and approaches that 
are used to study biological evolution may be productively be applied to the study of 
human culture, and furthermore, that the structure of a science of cultural evolution 
should broadly resemble the structure of evolutionary biology. (Mesoudi et al. 2006:329) 
In the commentary that followed the target article, evolutionary psychologist Jerome Barkow 
observed that “the authors’ proposal neglects most of sociocultural anthropology and related 
fields. What they include is worthy, but they pay scant attention to the likelihood that very few of 
the field's practitioners are interested in modeling their endeavor on any science, whether biology 
or meteorology” (2006:348). Barkow recommended turning “the bulk of existing sociocultural 
anthropology … into ore to mine and then to refine,” seeking out “those bits and pieces that have 
analogues in biology” and testing them “for compatibility with psychology (and biology, etc.)” 
(2006:349). Archaeologist Michael O’Brien, another commentator, asserted that social scientists 
“have often been downright hostile toward even considering cultural evolution in Darwinian 
terms” and have been “encouraged in this retreat by several prominent biologists and 
paleobiologists” such as Stephen Jay Gould and Ernst Mayr (2006:359). In their response to the 
commentaries, Mesoudi and colleagues agreed with Barkow and O’Brien's assessments but 
concluded with the hope that “the body of work that we have reviewed in this target article sends 
the message that there is now a clear, vibrant, productive, and rapidly growing alternative to this 
hostile-to-evolution, hostile-to-science tradition in the social sciences” and invited “social 
scientists frustrated with the negativity of post-modernist, deconstructivist, and other anti-
scientific movements within their discipline to join us in building a scientific theory of culture” 
(Mesoudi et al. 2006:375). 
Ingold (2007) has drawn attention to the version of “evolutionary biology” on which Mesoudi, 
his colleagues, and their supporters stake their scientific claims. “What passes as neo-Darwinism 
today,” Ingold writes, 
is a far cry from the kind of programme envisioned by the architects of the so-called 
“new synthesis” of mid-20th-century evolutionary biology—giants such as Julian 
Huxley, Ernst Mayr and Theodosius Dobzhansky, all of whom engaged respectfully with 
leading anthropologists of their day (Ingold 1986). My concern here is with the neo-
Darwinian paradigm in its contemporary incarnation, which is why, in the title of this 
article, I have placed “evolutionary biology” in quotation marks. This is intended as 
shorthand for “evolutionary biology as it is understood in the article by Mesoudi, Whiten, 
and Laland.” (Ingold 2007:13) 
As the citations above make plain, Mesoudi et al.'s version of evolutionary biology is presented 
to the world on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. To challenge it is to risk being labeled “hostile to 
evolution” and “hostile to science.” Even Ernst Mayr and Stephen Jay Gould are in jeopardy. 
The Anti-Antievolutionism Dilemma 
On one hand, as Agustín Fuentes insists, “any anthropologists worth their salt should agree that 
evolutionary perspectives are important to understanding humanity and that culture does change 
over time (evolve)” (2006a:547). However, as Ingold observes, “nothing causes more trouble, in 
the attempt to integrate evolutionary biology with sociocultural anthropology, than ‘evolutionary 
biology’ itself” (2007:13). One way to make one's peace with this state of affairs is to adopt 
some form of what I call “anti-antievolutionism.” Analogous to the “anti-antirelativism” 
identified by Clifford Geertz (1984), “anti-antievolutionism” describes the position of 
anthropologists who are more comfortable opposing the critics of evolutionary biology, broadly 
conceived, than they are defending “the neo-Darwinian paradigm in its contemporary 
incarnation” (Ingold 2007:13). 
The texts by Segal and Yanagisako, analyzed above, appear to be wrestling with a version of this 
dilemma. On one hand, they have no objection to “Darwinian theories of human evolution” in 
general, even though they object to specific evolutionary claims made in Darwin's name (i.e., the 
“social Darwinism” of “classical evolutionism”). However, to show skepticism about any claims 
made in Darwin's name could expose them to the charge of being “creationists” or “antiscience,” 
even though they apparently respect the science responsible for “Darwinian theories of 
evolution” and do not defend creationists. They appear to seek a middle way that allows them to 
attack reductionist “biological approaches” in anthropology without using the word evolution or 
to use the word evolution to encompass both biological and cultural evolutionary theories but to 
aim their critique only at the latter. And it is always possible to muddy the waters by censuring 
“holistic four-field anthropology,” as if it were responsible, all by itself, for this bewildering 
predicament. 
As the intricate maneuvers of Segal and Yanagisako illustrate, however, walking the narrow anti-
antievolutionism line is an imperfect solution. “So long as the answers do not involve a denial of 
evolution,” observes Jonathan Marks, “it is all Darwinian. To that extent, then, I am for a 
Darwinian anthropology, although I confess I consider it a trivial proposition” (2004:182). Still, 
keeping one's head down may be sensible: in Ingold's opinion, anthropologists who do speak out 
against current evolutionary orthodoxy “cannot expect much support from anthropological 
colleagues, in whose eyes to meddle with ‘evolutionary biology’ is generally to be tarred with 
the same brush” (2007:15). 
Polemics over the status of evolutionary thinking in anthropology, however, divert attention from 
a key question that regularly remains unasked: Is there only one “evolutionary tradition” on 
which anthropologists might draw? Cartmill, Chris Knight, Mesoudi et al., and many of their 
commentators leave the impression that this is so and that they are its defenders. The tension in 
Segal and Yanagisako's texts, however, suggests that they, too, believe only one evolutionary 
tradition exists and that this worries them. Therefore, they construct a convoluted argument that 
allows their use of evidence from evolutionary biology that undermines biological essentialism 
while simultaneously keeping at arm's length both the theory and the practicing biologists 
responsible for that evidence. 
Evolutionary Thinking, Mainstream and Dissident 
Is it true that evolutionary biology comes in only one “neo-Darwinian” version? Popular 
evolutionary accounts that lionize genes, the “master molecules” determining human destiny, 
suggest that the obvious answer must be “yes.” Accounts of cultural evolution like that of 
Mesoudi et al. 2006, modeled on this “molecular paradigm” (Neumann-Held and Rehmann-
Sutter 2006), would therefore seem to have undisputable scientific status. And yet, the obvious 
answer turns out to be wrong; the great successes of the molecular paradigm have had surprising 
consequences. Evelyn Fox Keller writes that the very success of molecular genetics has 
undermined genetic determinism (2000:5). Historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger agrees: 
even though the human genome has been decoded, there is “still a way to go from genomes to 
organisms,” and “the path from there to populations and communities … will not be shorter and 
left for still another generation” (2000:232). Neo-Darwinians like Mesoudi and colleagues, who 
now wish to extend the molecular paradigm to the study of cultural evolution, therefore, appear 
to have missed a watershed event in the history of evolutionary theory and practice. 
Yet theory and practice in evolutionary biology have always involved more than the molecular 
paradigm. David Depew and Bruce Weber show that “phrases like evolutionary synthesis and 
modern synthesis are problematic and ambiguous” and have been used in multiple ways; 
moreover, in their view, the “synthesis” looks “more like a treaty than a theory” (1995:299–300). 
Population genetics, biogeography, systematics, and paleontology were the first to sign the 
treaty; botany joined in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and ecology in the 1960s. Sherwood 
Washburn helped bring physical anthropology (but not cultural anthropology) into the synthesis. 
Developmental biology was excluded, pending the advance of developmental genetics (Depew 
and Weber 1995:301). As Ingold remarked, some architects of the synthesis did speak 
respectfully with anthropologists and were unwilling to encompass cultural processes within 
their models of genetic evolution. But the successes of molecular biology in the 1950s and 1960s 
destabilized such positions, shifting attention from organisms to genes. One consequence was 
Richard Dawkins's“selfish gene” (1976) explanation of altruism; another was E. O. Wilson's 
“new synthesis,” which proposed extending models of genetic evolution to cultural processes 
and which, as anthropologists know all too well, “has faced gales of resistance” (Depew and 
Weber 1995:301). 
However, evolutionary-research traditions excluded from the synthesis nurtured “dissident” 
theoretical projects of their own (Depew and Weber 1995:278). Perhaps the most significant was 
Waddington's work in developmental biology. In his lifetime, as Keller writes, 
Waddington was something of an outlier. With one foot in genetics and the other in 
embryology, he had never belonged to the mainstream of either discipline; nor was he a 
participant in the new field of molecular biology. Moreover, as a committed follower of 
Alfred North Whitehead, he was a perennial critic of what he referred to as “the genetical 
theory of genes,” seeking throughout his life to supplement that theory with a more 
dynamic and process-oriented “epigenetic theory.”(2000:78) 
In 1959, Waddington published an article in which he argued that biological evolution “is carried 
out by a mechanism which involves four major factors” or subsystems, each of which exerts its 
influences at different points in an organism's life cycle. Early in development, animals (if not 
plants) “are usually surrounded by a much wider range of environmental conditions than they are 
willing to inhabit,” which means they must “select the particular habitat in which their life will 
be passed,” thus incorporating themselves into “the exploitive system” (Waddington 1959:1635–
1636). As they begin to function in their chosen niches, developing animals are then exposed to 
stresses that reveal certain potentialities; these responses are part of “the epigenetic system.” 
According to Waddington, “those individuals in which responses are of most adaptive value” 
will be favored by the natural selective system, and mutation will modify the selected 
potentialities within the genetic system (1959:1635–1636). Where humans are concerned, 
Waddington identified a new mode of hereditary transmission, the cultural or “sociogenetic” 
system, that permitted humans to acquire capacities “[that], in the nonhuman world, could only 
have been obtained as the results of evolution” (1959:1636). To Waddington, the appearance of 
culture, however, did not mean that genes no longer mattered. He writes, “Human inventiveness 
and skill, just like any character of any organism, are produced by the interaction of genes with 
one another and with the environment during development” (Waddington 1959:1636). Still, as 
Waddington points out, “human evolution has been in the first place a cultural evolution” 
(1959:1636). 
Waddington's scheme is notable for at least three reasons. First, his suggestion that evolution 
encompassed several distinct systems foreshadows discussions of multiple inheritance systems 
that would appear by the early 1980s (see below). Second, his discussion of the “exploitive 
system” adumbrates the notion, proposed by Lewontin, that would come to be called “niche 
construction” (Lewontin 1982, 1983; Odling-Smee et al. 2003:29–30). Finally, his concern for 
the ways in which the events of development are consequential for evolutionary outcomes 
resonates with concerns raised by more recent theorists. Gould (1977) argued that some features 
of adult phenotypes were more likely a consequence of constraints encountered during 
development than of natural selection on genes. Such “spandrels” (Gould and Lewontin 1979) 
might, under changed selective regimes, become subject to natural selection in their own right, a 
phenomenon called “exaptation” (Vrba and Gould 1982). Susan Oyama (2000) challenged the 
notion that genes embodied all the “information” needed to build organisms by demonstrating in 
detail how such “information” is produced in the course of development. And William Wimsatt 
argued that genetic programming was not needed to explain why phenotypic features present 
early in development were stable: because organismic development is a sequential process, later 
stages come to depend on earlier stages (however generated), a phenomenon called “generative 
entrenchment” (Wimsatt 1986; Wimsatt and Schank 1988). 
Alternative Evolutionary Frameworks: A Contemporary Classification 
Anthropologists need to know that several alternative approaches currently circulate among 
scholars, scientists, and theorists interested in biological, cognitive, and cultural evolution. They 
go under a variety of sometimes confusing names, reflecting their origin in a range of debates in 
different disciplines. Philosopher of biology James Griesemer (2006) has sorted the most 
prominent of these approaches into three categories: structural perspectives, functional 
perspectives, and process perspectives. 
Structural Perspectives 
According to Griesemer, structural perspectives “model phenomena by representing structures. 
The most common structural perspective on units of evolution is that of a hierarchy of 
compositional levels of spatial organization: molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs, 
organisms, populations, species” (2006:201). Molecular genes play a central role in structural 
models of hereditary transmission offered by population biologists (Griesemer 2006:201–202). 
Different structural models do not concur about which (or how many) levels of the compositional 
hierarchy contain units subject to natural selection. All structural perspectives, however, face 
limitations because they assume, rather than investigate or demonstrate, the existence of 
hierarchical levels of composition and because they are unable to model biological development 
(Griesemer 2006:204). 
Functional Perspectives 
Functional perspectives in evolutionary biology attempt to connect compositional entities 
identified in the structural hierarchy with the genotypic and phenotypic functions recognized by 
the modern synthesis. Richard Dawkins (1983) distinguished “replicators” that serve the 
genotypic inheritance function by making copies of themselves from “vehicles” or “interactors” 
(Hull 1988) that serve the phenotypic interaction function by undergoing natural selection. But 
even though replicators and interactors perform key functions in evolutionary process, 
functionalist perspectives, like structural perspectives, take the evolutionary process itself for 
granted (Griesemer 2006:205). Functionalists also locate causes for both development and 
inheritance in replicators (i.e., genes in biological evolution). Phenotypic variation among 
interactors is assumed to map directly onto properties of the replicators they carry, so that 
selection on interactors directly determines the replicator inheritance passed onto the next 
generation. But functionalist models cannot demonstrate the covariance between gene–replicator 
and phenotype–interactor: “Only the coupling of statistical fates in the common cause suggests a 
single coherent process moving through time” (Griesemer 2006:206). 
In the past 30 years, formal attempts to theorize cultural evolution as a Darwinian process have 
been influenced by functional models of biological evolution. Charles Lumsden and E. O. 
Wilson (1981) adopted a functional perspective in which adaptive social behaviors, previously 
considered socially or culturally learned, were reinterpreted as phenotypic outcomes of selection 
on genes. When Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985) challenged Lumsden and Wilson, they 
not only critiqued their formal models but also offered formal models of their own, showing how 
natural selection on cultural variants could, in certain environments, promote the evolution of 
culture. Their demonstration also had structural implications, positing the existence of cultural 
units subject to natural selection that give rise to a second inheritance system alongside genetic 
inheritance. Other formal “neo-Darwinian” models of cultural evolution share this approach 
(e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Durham 1991; Mesoudi et al. 2006). However, John 
Odling-Smee and colleagues (2003) posit three inheritance systems involving genes, memes, and 
artifacts, and Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb speak of “evolution in four dimensions,” 
distinguishing genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic inheritance systems, all of which 
generate variation on which natural selection may act (Jablonka and Lamb 2006). 
Functionalist perspectives on cultural evolution, however, ignore developmental processes (such 
as “enculturation” and “socialization”) within which cultural “information” may become relevant 
to human agents; they also disregard the larger evolutionary process within which selection on 
cultural variants is supposed to take place. Functionalist models of cultural evolution also face 
the chronic challenge of identifying units of culture suitable for formal neo-Darwinian modeling. 
Fuentes observed, for example, that Mesoudi and colleagues “use the term ‘culture trait’ at least 
27 times without offering an explicit definition,” lumping together “diverse elements that may 
not share common structural components or patterns of heritability” (2006b:354; see also Ingold 
2007:16). Thus, just like functional models of biological evolution, functional models of cultural 
evolution face a structural hierarchy problem. Cultural agents who select the QWERTY 
keyboard over alternatives are presumed to be operating in a setting not unlike a capitalist 
marketplace of ideas and commodities. But the structure of this marketplace—and the social, 
economic, political, and ecological scaffolding that sustains and supplies it—figure nowhere in 
the model. What kind of complex, heterogeneous, constructed world produces keyboards in the 
first place, and where did it come from?“Classical evolution” solved this problem by assuming 
that cultural worlds with hierarchical structures appeared as automatic consequences of the laws 
of nature or history and did not need to be explained. But this solution is closed to a Darwinian 
perspective that rejects deterministic stagism, whether Spencerian or Marxian. 
Do memes or cultural variants corresponding to genotypes exist “mostly inside people's heads” 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005), and do observable behaviors constitute the “phenotypes” of those 
cultural variants? A number of the commentators on Mesoudi et al. 2006, including many 
sympathetic to their project, do not accept their understanding of units of culture. Robert Aunger 
questions whether the replicator versus interactor distinction is even applicable to cultural 
evolution (Aunger 2006). As Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb have observed, “when we imitate, 
what is copied is the ‘phenotype’ of the meme. … So even mechanical imitation is not equivalent 
to the replication of genes. And if imitation is not mechanical, if what is to be imitated is 
evaluated by the imitator, then imitation is a context- and content-sensitive process, not mere 
copying” (2006:211). What “copying” means in this context becomes problematic (Griesemer 
2006:218), constituting a further limitation on functionalist accounts of cultural evolution. 
Process Perspectives 
Process perspectives identify “units of evolution with processes rather than with objects or 
functions” (Griesemer 2006:208). Taking for granted neither the structural hierarchy of 
compositional units nor the functional distinction between genotype and phenotype, they focus 
on the origin of these phenomena. That is, they address “the problem of evolutionary transition—
the evolution of new (structural and functional) levels of biological organization” (Griesemer 
2006:207–208)—a matter that structural and functional perspectives ignore and that Darwin did 
not address. Griesemer categorizes as process perspectives both DST and niche construction—
the “recent enhancements of Darwinian perspectives” to which Fuentes refers (2006b:354). 
Ingold has incorporated insights from DST in his own work for some years now and was the 
only anthropologist to contribute an article (Ingold 2001) to Cycles of Contingency (Oyama et al. 
2001a), the edited volume that serves as both an introduction to, and manifesto for, DST. 
Developmental Systems Theory emerged from the efforts of psychologists, evolutionary 
theorists, and philosophers of biology who were interested in the evolution of cognition and 
highly critical of the way gene selectionism perpetuates the split between “nature” and “nurture.” 
Insisting that the actions of genes cannot be understood in isolation from the machinery of the 
cells in which they are found, Susan Oyama, a key DST theorist, stresses “the necessity of 
viewing transactions between an entity and its surround as aspects of a single system” and a 
focus on the “mobile interchange” of organisms that alter their environments as much as 
environments alter organisms (2000:7). But Oyama and other DST theorists do not conceive of 
genes, organisms, or environments as self-sufficient, self-enclosed entities that “interact” with 
one another. Rather, all three are understood to be porous entities that enter into complex 
relations with one another within the developmental system that constitutes the life cycle of 
every organism; this is why DST is also sometimes called a “relational” perspective. Thus, 
development is understood “not as the reading off of a preexisting code, but as a complex of 
interacting influences, some inside the organism's skin, some external to it, and including its 
ecological niche in all its spatial and temporal aspects” (Oyama 2000:39). This is why DST 
theorists reject accounts of evolution that propose multiple separate inheritance systems. Instead, 
they argue that “causal interactions among such processes are organized into a developmental 
system which behaves as a unit life cycle in replication” (Griesemer 2006:209). 
DST incorporates niche construction (Oyama et al. 2001a) because niche construction draws 
attention to the ways in which organisms make themselves, in part, by making their own 
environments. Development within a constructed niche does not mean that organisms are 
somehow removed from the pressures of natural selection. Rather, the constructed niche alters 
the kinds of selection pressures they experience: they are buffered from some pressures but 
exposed to new pressures generated by the constructed niche itself. The agency of organisms is 
highlighted by niche construction, which includes the option to leave one's current niche and 
seek out another one: Odling-Smee and colleagues, for example, call this “inceptive relocational 
niche construction” (2003:64–65). Fuentes argues that Odling-Smee and colleagues’ 
understanding of niche construction “can be read explicitly as a solid argument for a 
constructivist evolutionary approach, one that is potentially largely anthropological in practice,” 
and urges that niche construction be recognized as “a core factor in human behavioral evolution” 
(2007:13, 16). Archaeologist Bruce D. Smith affirms that niche construction “provides an 
important evolutionary and behavioral context for understanding … the initial domestication of 
plants and animals,” because such a context removes “the proximate mystery. … Domestication 
was not the product of unusual ‘outside the envelope’ behavior patterns, but emerged out of 
coherent preexisting resource management systems” (2007:195–196). 
Griesemer's second example of an evolutionary process perspective is “process structuralism,” 
which “emphasizes laws and generic (i.e., nonselective) outcomes of developmental processes as 
the basis for a rational and mature science of biology” (2006:209). Process structural approaches 
underscore the role of non-Darwinian processes of complex self-organization and emergence in 
the evolution and development of living organisms. Prominent process structuralists include 
Waddington's student Brian Goodwin, who rejects the notion that a genetic program guides 
organismic development. Instead, Goodwin argues that embryogenesis involves spontaneous 
shape formation, describable in terms of “rational,” physical laws at work within a 
“morphological field” that encompasses all the dynamic relations of the developing organism in 
its environment; genes simply set the parameter values within which morphogenesis may occur 
(1993:130, 136). Tim Ingold has used Goodwin's understanding of the genesis of organic form 
not only to account for the self-organization of living organisms but also, by analogy, to describe 
the genesis of social form out of the emerging relationships among persons in a social field 
(1990) and the growth of the form of artifacts as emergent the process of their manufacture 
(1990:221, 2000:345). Stuart Kauffman, another process structuralist, stresses the role of 
spontaneous self-organizational processes both during the transition from nonlife to life and in 
organismic development. Using computer simulations to demonstrate how “disordered 
dynamical systems” can yield “powerfully ordered dynamics,” Kauffman (1993:284) argues that 
“many features of organisms might reflect such self-organization rather than the handiwork of 
selection” but acknowledges that “natural selection is always at work in actual biology.” He 
concludes that what is needed is “a theory exploring how selection acts on, and modifies, 
systems with self-ordered properties, and to understand the limits upon selection” (Kauffman 
1993:284). 
Francisco Varela and colleagues (1991) modeled the evolution of cognition in terms of complex 
self-organization. Drawing on discussions of autopoiesis (or self-organization) in living systems 
by Varela and Humberto Maturana (Maturana and Varela 1980, 1987), they argued that self-
organizing living systems are operationally (i.e., functionally) closed while remaining 
thermodynamically open to inputs of energy or materials. Varela and colleagues view developing 
organisms as agents generated from the densely interconnected, distributed agency of the 
elements out of which they are made. Nevertheless, living self-organizing systems cannot exist 
in a vacuum. Real minds, for example, conceived of as emergent and autonomous networks, are 
always “constrained by a history of coupling with an appropriate world. By enriching our 
account to include this dimension of structural coupling, we can begin to appreciate the capacity 
of a complex system to enact a world” (Varela et al. 1991:151). “Enacting a world” involves the 
autonomous network's responses to perturbations it encounters in its wider milieu: “Over time 
this coupling selects or enacts from a world of randomness a domain of distinctions … that has 
relevance for the structure of the system. In other words, on the basis of its autonomy the system 
selects or enacts a domain of significance” (Varela et al. 1991:155). As a result, for living 
systems, “the meaning of this or that interaction … is not prescribed from outside but is the result 
of the organization and history of the system itself” (Varela et al. 1991:157). 
To analyze how “current or reliably reconstructed languages change over time,” linguistic 
anthropologist William Foley (2007:1) has rejected “orthodox neo-Darwinism” in favor of 
“enactive evolutionary theories” such as autopoeisis–natural drift and Developmental Systems 
Theory. Foley values these approaches because they not only take into account “the traditional 
insights and discoveries of historical linguistics” but also offer new insights into issues that 
historical linguistics was unable to handle, such as “the demarcation between language 
community and speech community and the deconstruction of the notion of speaker” (Foley 
2007:23). Autopoeisis–natural drift helps in two main ways. First, because it claims that 
environmental perturbations trigger, but do not specify, changes in the nervous system, it 
provides an alternative to representational theories of meaning (Foley 2007:4). Second, by 
embedding linguistic replication within “a network of communicative practices between two or 
more self-organizing unities, in realized linguistic practices,” it articulates with contemporary 
views in linguistic anthropology that decenter the role of grammar (Foley 2007:13). DST, in 
turn, by highlighting “the multiple levels of interacting resources available for replication,” 
offers Foley an alternative to gene-directed models of evolutionary process (2007:13). 
Foley identifies a range of linguistic components functioning as replicators at different levels of 
linguistic organization, principally individual signs, individual languages, and individual speech 
genres. He likens biological species to individual languages, but only if the speech communities 
associated with them are conceived as ideologically defined “imagined communities” (Foley 
2007:14). He likens a biological organism not to an individual speaker but, rather, to “the lineage 
of stances that a speaking organism co-constructs with its interactant(s) in co-development in 
social interaction,” stances that themselves are “embedded in larger networks of replicating 
developmental linguistic resources, from a sign to a sentence to a genre to a language” 
(2007:19). Theorists of cultural evolution might note that although Foley speaks of “replicators,” 
by identifying so many of them at different levels and by dissolving the “interactors” into 
components distributed throughout the system of structural coupling, his analysis in effect 
deconstructs the replicator–interactor distinction. Foley also cites Lewontin's (1983) discussion 
of the organism as subject and object of evolution without using the term “niche construction,” 
arguing instead that “the interrelation between organism and environment is the basis of natural 
drift” (Foley 2007:5). 
Indeed, niche construction emerges as a richly suggestive notion capable of traveling across a 
number of functional and process perspectives in evolutionary thought. Griesemer describes the 
role of niche construction in DST “as a developmentalist research strategy for modeling 
‘environmental’ resources in interaction with ‘internal’ organism resources” (2006:209), 
emphasizing those aspects of niche construction highlighted by Waddington's “exploitive 
system.” But this interpretation exists in tension with attempts by Odling-Smee and colleagues to 
model niche construction for evolving populations using formal neo-Darwinian models (see 
Odling-Smee et al. 2003:chs. 7–9).
1
 As noted above, Odling-Smee and colleagues have argued 
for the recognition of three inheritance systems involving genes, memes (cultural variants), and 
“artifacts,” respectively. They define artifacts as products of niche construction: material 
features of the environment, such as beaver dams or termite mounds, that are produced by the 
activity of organisms. When organisms reconstruct environments, they pass down a legacy of 
modified selection pressures to future generations of developing organisms, either their own 
offspring or other organisms who depend on the modified environment for their own survival. In 
the view of Odling-Smee and colleagues, niche construction is as important an evolutionary 
process as natural selection; for it to take its rightful theoretical place, however, would require 
expanding and restructuring the modern evolutionary synthesis (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
But niche construction has also been explicitly associated with complex systems theories. 
Anthropologist Terrence Deacon argues that the evolution of symbolic human language cannot 
be understood until theorists address “the complex self-organizing and evolutionary dynamics 
that form the very essence of its design logic” (2003a:81). Deacon invokes niche construction in 
his discussion of brain-language coevolution, insisting that language “is not just a passively 
constructed niche, like a beaver dam … but is a complex dynamic niche, with something like a 
‘life of its own’” (2003b:111). By contrast, anthropologist Stephen Lansing, inspired by 
Lewontin (2000), invokes niche construction to describe social institutions that “emerge from the 
bottom up, as a result of feedback processes linking social actors to their environments” 
(2002:287). Lansing's key example of a complex adaptive system as constructed niche is “the 
water temple networks with which Balinese farmers manage their centuries old irrigation 
systems and rice terraces” (2002:287). When Lansing and colleagues used data from Lansing's 
work on Balinese wet-rice agriculture to construct a computer model based on James Lovelock's 
Daisyworld simulation, they found that it “accurately predicts the actual structure of functional 
organization along two Balinese rivers” (1998:350). 
Niche construction is important to Lansing because it highlights the shortcomings of “replicator 
dynamics” (2002:286), especially as they are used in artificial societies modeling. Lansing 
echoes Lewontin's complaints about adaptationist thinking in evolutionary theory: replicator 
dynamics neglects “the active role of organisms in constructing their own environments” and 
treats natural selection as “a one-way influence between organism and environment” that refuses 
to pay attention to feedback loops. But how to model these processes mathematically? 
Approaching niche construction from population genetics, Lewontin himself speaks of “the co-
evolution of organism and environment in which both are acting both as causes and effects” 
(2000:101), proposing a pair of coupled differential equations that must be solved together. 
Odling-Smee and colleagues, coming from evolutionary biology and ecology, have adopted both 
Lewontin's concept and his way of mathematizing it. 
Lansing, however, approaches niche construction as a critical ecological anthropologist who, like 
Segal and Yanagisako, has inherited a 20th-century suspicion of all 19th-century master 
narratives of cultural evolution. He is also interested in the interplay of determinate and 
contingent cultural processes at levels of complexity that the methods of population biology are 
ill-equipped to handle. He wants to know how large-scale, intricate material and cultural 
structures emerge, develop, and maintain themselves over long periods of history—and what 
happens when unexpected historical conjunctures push them in unpredictable directions. “What 
we would really like to know,” he asks, “and what descriptive statistical methods alone usually 
cannot tell us, is the likelihood of a given outcome, a given social reality. ‘What if the 
evolutionary tape were run again?’ as Stephen Jay Gould famously asked” (Lansing 2002:282). 
Lansing's answer is in terms of emergence: methodologies used in artificial-societies research 
offer the possibility of modeling alternative emergent outcomes of nonlinear processes involving 
heterogeneous actors and environments. Such models include terms not only for agents but also 
for the environments in which they are embedded, which acknowledge Lewontin's arguments in 
favor of niche construction. But such models also impress Lansing because they promise 
hypothetical answers to Gould's question, because the likelihoods of different, given social 
realities—their “propensities”—“turn out to be properties of the whole dynamical system” 
(2002:285). 
Lansing's analysis takes the discussion of niche construction directly into the domain of complex 
cultural change and highlights a serious challenge: How can anthropologists do evolutionary 
theory in a way that articulates biological levels of organization (e.g., molecules, genes, cells, 
tissues, organs, organisms) to different and broader social, cultural, and environmental levels of 
organization (e.g., ecological systems, social systems, cultural systems)? Until now, the best 
anthropologists have been able to do is to conceive of societies, cultures, languages, and 
ecosystems as if they were organisms, leading to variations of Durkheimian or Boasian “holism.” 
It would be extremely helpful if evolutionary anthropologists could find a way to think about 
structures beyond the organism in terms that were not always some version of the organism writ 
large. 
Lansing's originality is to approach “cultural evolution” issues from a process perspective that 
foregrounds the production of complex relationality, rather than the reduction of complexity to 
the action of a prime mover. In this respect, his approach resonates with that of William 
Wimsatt, who calls himself a “philosopher of the inexact sciences” (2007:21)—that is, 
everything in between the largest and smallest things in the universe. But how does one do “a 
philosophy for messy systems, for the real world, for the ‘in-between’” (Wimsatt 2007:6)? Must 
Ockham's razor be abandoned? Wimsatt's reply is that “with the right standards, one could 
remain an Ockhamite while recognizing a world that has the rich multi-layered and 
interdependent ontology of the tropical rain forest—that is, our world” (Wimsatt 2007:193–194). 
Wimsatt's key criterion for what is real is “robustness,” a concept he borrowed from ecologist 
Richard Levins: “Things are robust if they are accessible (detectable, measurable, derivable, 
definable, producible, or the like) in a variety of independent ways” (2007:56, 195). What 
Wimsatt calls “robustness analysis” is sometimes also called “bootstrapping” or “triangulation” 
(2007:54); Griesemer (2006) recommends it as a method for testing alternative evolutionary 
models, and anthropologists know it well. As philosopher of archaeology Alison Wylie has 
observed, “triangulation on a single aspect of an archaeological subject is sometimes possible 
and important: the routine use of multiple lines of evidence to date an artifact, feature, or stratum 
testify to this. But more often diverse (independent) resources are used to constitute evidence of 
quite distinct aspects of a past context” (1996:328). She also notes that “when independence is 
realized in this sense, it ensures that, while observations are clearly loaded with theory … the 
theory with which they are loaded has no connection with the subject under 
investigation … evidence may sometimes have considerable autonomy from the hypotheses it is 
used to support or evaluate” (Wylie 1996:328). 
It is Wimsatt's understanding of what is real in terms of what is robust that allows him to turn 
“reductionism” into “both target and resource.” This is possible because, according to Wimsatt, 
there are at least two kinds of reduction. One kind, eliminative reduction, “is a kind of theory 
reduction … in which higher-level objects and relations are systematically eliminated in favor of 
lower level ones, rather than extended, modified, or transformed” (Wimsatt 2007:167); this is the 
target that must be destroyed. A second kind of reduction, however, can serve as a resource: 
namely, “the explanation of upper level phenomena and regularities in terms of lower-level 
mechanisms. It is never eliminative” (Wimsatt 2007:167; see also McKinnon and Silverman 
2005b:1). This is because, Wimsatt insists, “robust higher-level entities, relations, and 
regularities do not disappear wholesale in lower-level scientific revolutions—our conceptions of 
them transmute and add new dimensions in interesting ways, yes, but disappear, no” (2007:168). 
Wimsatt is offering a relational, “process” philosophy of science in which “reduction,” no longer 
eliminative, is transmuted into tracing the ways lower-level and higher-level phenomena 
articulate. He shows how attempts to argue for the eliminative reduction of robust higher-level 
phenomena rest on a series of “functional localization fallacies” (2007:61), which he enumerates 
in great detail (and which every anthropologist will recognize). Finally, Wimsatt is not bound to 
a totalitarian view of human culture: “Our cognitive capabilities and institutions are not less 
engineered and re-engineered than our biology and technology, both collections of layered 
kluges and exaptations” (2007:6). 
Lansing's recent work Perfect Order: Recognizing Complexity in Bali (2006) offers a glimpse of 
what can be revealed when attention is paid to the way heterogeneous lower-level and higher-
level phenomena articulate, sustain, and feed back on one another, over time and across space. 
From one chapter to the next, Lansing's book exposes the emerging materiosemiotic processes 
and historical contingencies that have coproduced the complex infrastructure that supports 
contemporary Balinese self-understanding. Robust higher-level entities, relations, and 
regularities do not disappear but, rather, are scaffolded by (and feed back on) entrenched lower-
level phenomena. Lansing makes clear that nothing but the constant, laborious intervention of 
human agents can stabilize relations among heterogeneous higher-level entities. When agency 
successfully articulates with infrastructure, however, the Balinese cultural model of “perfect 
order” emerges. 
Paying attention to niche construction permits Lansing to show how contingent processes set in 
motion generations ago have given rise to elaborate cultural structures that have become 
increasingly stabilized and “foundational” as they have come to serve as scaffolding for 
additional processes and structures that have emerged over the course of Balinese history. 
Exposing the scaffolding allows Lansing to “remove the proximate mystery” that would make 
the existence (and persistence) of these heterogeneous, convoluted, entrenched cultural forms 
otherwise hard to explain. As we saw in Foley's processual account of linguistic history, 
however, some scholars who have adopted relational evolutionary approaches resist 
acknowledging openly the existence of scaffolding. Such resistance seems to reflect commitment 
to process accounts that concentrate attention (and material agency) in organisms. In 1990, for 
example, in response to “the final disappearance of the organism from modern biology” that 
followed the triumph of neo-Darwinian views, Ingold deliberately proposed “an alternative 
biology that takes the organism as its point of departure” (1990:209). Because “neo-Darwinian 
sociobiology leaves us without a theory of the person,” Ingold also proposed an alternative 
anthropology that takes persons as the point of departure, insisting that the organism and the 
person are one (1990:209, 220). “In recapturing persons for anthropology,” he declared, “I 
follow the same approach as in my recapturing organisms for biology” (Ingold 1990:209). “The 
environment,” clearly essential to the developmental genesis of organism or person, remained 
indistinct and untheorized. 
I believe that Ingold's goal of bringing the anthropology of persons within the biology of 
organisms will never succeed unless the “the environment” itself is “recaptured”—both for 
biology and for anthropology. On the basis of the foregoing arguments, moreover, I would insist 
that the environment and the constructed niche are one, for all organisms, not just for humans. In 
fact, by 2004, Ingold's treatment of the environment had changed, although his ambivalence still 
shows. He returned to his familiar example of walking, contrasting the traditional “shuffling 
gait” in rural Japan with the upright, striding gait of Europeans, and each walker's activity was 
now contextualized within a more fully characterized constructed niche. For the Japanese person, 
this included sandals on the feet, a long pole with heavy loads at either end slung over one 
shoulder, and the steep terrain over which the walker must make his or her way. For upright, 
striding Europeans, he observed that “carrying devices, from rucksacks to suitcases are designed 
with this posture in mind” (Ingold 2004:216). It is somewhat disappointing that, in summarizing 
this example a few lines later, the material scaffolding (footwear, the pole with its loads, and 
rucksacks and suitcases) has disappeared, and walking is described only as the product of 
“practice and training within an environment that includes skilled caregivers and a certain terrain 
(Ingold 2004:216). Nevertheless, Ingold acknowledges almost immediately that people 
do not live their lives in a vacuum, but in a world where they are surrounded by other 
people, objects and places, making up what is usually known as the environment. 
Growing up in an environment largely shaped by the activities of their predecessors, 
human beings play their part, through their intentional activities, in fashioning the 
conditions of development for their successors. This is what we call history. (2004:217) 
If an environment “exists only in relation to the organisms that inhabit it, and embodies a history 
of interactions with them” (Ingold 2004:218), what else can that environment be but a 
constructed niche? 
If history is the process, then persons and organisms and constructed niches are all history's 
products. But if evolution is a process that includes development and embraces historical 
contingencies that may become entrenched as scaffolds for further biological or cultural 
elaboration, then evolution—biological or cultural—is a historical process. In that case, it might 
make sense to talk about cultural evolution as Wimsatt and Griesemer do, arguing that the role of 
culture in human life is best revealed by examining “the ways culture and genes interact to 
scaffold individual and group development in the context of social groups and social worlds 
(2007:253). The three kinds of scaffolding they identify—artifacts, infrastructure, and 
developmental-agent scaffolding (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007:276)—all appear in Ingold's 
accounts of skills that are incorporated into organisms: artifacts like sandals, rucksacks, and 
poles with heavy loads; infrastructures like particular kinds of “terrain” (or the paths people 
make through them); and developmental agents like “skilled caregivers.” Wimsatt and Griesemer 
cite with approval Ingold's view (2000) that dwellings are the products of “ongoing processes of 
dwelling, continuous and contiguous with our history of our species,” but they also argue that 
dwellings are “prime exemplars and iconic metaphors of scaffolding that assume a central 
importance in our developmental account of cultural cumulation and change” (2007:235). 
With this in mind, it becomes possible to recast, for example, the multigenerational data 
collected by Yanagisako (2002) on family firms active in the silk industry of Como, Italy, within 
an evolutionary framework that highlights the cultural scaffolding for development of families, 
firms, and individual, gendered, bourgeois subjectivities (including the sentiments that incite 
men to found families and firms). Yanagisako often talks about dwellings that scaffold individual 
developmental trajectories: family homes that shelter siblings, their spouses, and sometimes 
multiple generations and whose state of repair indexes their dwellers’ degree of access to the 
family firm's economic success. Dwellings as scaffolds are “convenient, ‘rationalized,’ safe 
developmental contexts for particular things or kinds of things and acts of using them” and are 
“essentially relational” (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007:276). In Como, the notion of “dwelling” 
might usefully be expanded to include additional structured developmental niches in which 
crucial skills are scaffolded for some family members and not others: settings like technical 
schools, universities, or firms where future managers serve apprenticeships. All these dwellings 
may be regarded as materiosemiotic components of even more intricate class-fraction-based 
constructed niches, within which the gendered subjectivities of individuals (and the sentiments 
that motivate them) are scaffolded. These locally constructed niches may become differentially 
entrenched as components of broader constructed niches that reach beyond Como, or even 
beyond Italy. 
At the same time, changes in those broader constructed niches that impinge on families and firms 
may alter or undermine local scaffolding, as when lower birthrates and laws supporting the 
equality of women and men alter the opportunities to be scaffolded by dwellings of a particular 
kind, creating openings for girls into settings that scaffold for them the skills and sentiments that 
help them “grow into” managers of their own firms. Such an account only enriches Yanagisako's 
analysis of “how these individuals have arrived at the sentiments and desires that lead them to 
pursue the particular entrepreneurial projects that, in turn, have shaped both their families and the 
silk industry of Como” (2002:4). 
Conclusion 
What difference would it make if anthropology incorporated relational evolutionary thinking? 
First, by rejecting the mainstream “neo-Darwinian” position that ontogeny (development) 
contributes nothing to phylogeny (evolution), it decenters the focus on genes as prime movers, 
offering clear alternatives to eliminative reductionism. By acknowledging the evolutionary 
productivity of developmental processes, relational evolutionary perspectives could thereby help 
shift discussion away from sterile nature–nurture debates. Second, within this enlarged terrain, it 
will be possible to address matters of anthropological concern that “neo-Darwinian” perspectives 
either ignore or handle poorly. For example, all the relational approaches discussed here reveal 
the way structural features of evolutionary processes impinge on each other and how that 
articulation can give rise to new structures and functions that feed back on themselves, pushing 
the processes along sometimes surprising paths. Both biological and cultural evolution are 
reconfigured once the split between inside and outside processes is disallowed: otherwise 
mysterious events that appear to defy explanation begin to make sense when the underlying 
processes and infrastructures that scaffold them are acknowledged. This is evident in Smith's and 
Lansing's endorsements of niche construction: both show that the historicity of culture is not 
threatened but explained by cultural evolutionary models in which biological development plays 
a central role. 
Third, interesting parallels emerge when processes are compared: the “constructivist 
interactionism” of heterogeneous resources of DST and the structural coupling associated with 
natural drift echo actor-network theory's disclosure of heterogeneous articulations between living 
and nonliving, human and nonhuman, actants in science studies, which is echoed again in niche 
construction's insistence on linking living and nonliving components of ecosystems. These 
perspectives further resonate with process approaches adopted by archaeologists and cultural 
anthropologists influenced by science studies (Hodder 2005; Meskell 2005; Tsing 2005) and by 
cultural anthropologists who draw both on science studies and the writings of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari to make sense of complex, emerging, and heterogeneous social, political, and 
economic assemblages (e.g., Ong and Collier 2005). Much work remains to be done exploring 
the similarities, differences, and potential interconnections among these views. Still, philosopher 
of science Isabelle Stengers (2002) has recently reread the work of Deleuze and Guattari together 
with the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, who inspired Waddington (Ingold has 
been reading all three for years; see Ingold 1990). Is it utopian to imagine the emergence of a 
relational evolutionary discourse in anthropology flexible enough to accommodate productive 
conversations across the subfields? Perhaps. Nevertheless, I believe that relational evolutionary 
thinking offers a viable and exciting alternative to mainstream evolutionary views that many 
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1. These two projects may seem at cross purposes, reflecting tensions present in the text itself. 
This is perhaps also illustrated by the fact that Kevin Laland is a coauthor both of Niche 
Construction with Odling-Smee and Feldman and of “Towards a Unified Science of Cultural 
Evolution” with Alex Mesoudi and Andrew Whiten. 
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